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When we can’t live up to the ultimate standards of morality, how can moral theory 
give us guidance? We can distinguish between ideal and non-ideal theory to see that 
there are different versions of the voluntarist constraint, ‘ought implies can.’ Ideal 
moral theory identifies the best standard, so its demands are constrained by one 
version. Non-ideal theory tells us what to do given our psychological and motivational 
shortcomings and so is constrained by others. Moral theory can now both provide an 
ultimate standard and give us guidance; this view also gives us new insights into 
demandingness and blame.  
Introduction 
There is an apparent tension between two tasks of moral theory. On the one hand, 
morality should provide a standard for us to live up to, a standard that does not 
yield to facts about our individual psychological or motivational shortcomings. But 
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at the same time, morality has to provide action guidance for us as we are, with our 
flaws and idiosyncrasies. How can morality guide our actions when we cannot live 
up to its standard? 
 This tension is related to another debate, about the role, plausibility, and 
correct interpretation of the voluntarist constraint, that ought implies can. If ought 
implies can, as is commonly believed, we cannot be obligated to do something that 
is impossible for us. But there is disagreement about what the constraint means. 
How strictly should we interpret the ‘can’ in ‘ought implies can’? 
 We can use the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory to make 
progress on these two issues. First, I show why the tasks of moral theory are often 
incompatible. I then turn to the voluntarist constraint. I argue that there are 
different modalities appropriate to different sets of obligations and, hence, 
different readings of the voluntarist constraint. That is, there is no single ‘can,’ or 
‘ought,’ in ‘ought implies can.’ We should recognize the ways in which different 
kinds of inability constrain different kinds of obligations for an agent.  
Morality can both provide an ultimate standard and guide our actions when 
we make use of these different interpretations of the voluntarist constraint.  This 
is where the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory can help us.1 Ideal 
morality identifies the best standard, without yielding to our flaws, and so its 
demands are constrained only by a thin version of the voluntarist constraint, using 
physical possibility.  In contrast, non-ideal morality tells us what to do given our 
present situation and shortcomings. Its demands are constrained by thicker 
versions of the voluntarist constraint, taking into account features of our 
psychology and motivational structure.  As we transition from non-ideal to ideal 
morality, we thin out the voluntarist constraint. When we use this approach, 
morality can accomplish all of its tasks. I close by showing how this helps us to 
determine both how much morality should demand of us and also how 
blameworthy we are when we fail to meet those demands. 
1. Two tasks of moral theory 
Begin with two intuitive pictures of morality, describing two kinds of tasks moral 
theory might have. First, on one view, a central task of moral theory is to provide 
the ultimate standard for us to live up to. If you hold this view, you might also 
believe some or all of the following things about moral theory: 
 Moral theory should evaluate our actions. A good moral theory should tell 
us what’s praiseworthy, blameworthy, and morally neutral. A good moral theory 
should tell us what the best life is, morally speaking. We should be able to learn 
from moral theory who the moral exemplars are. We may have no hope of 
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approximating the good moral character of a Jesus or a Buddha, but moral theory 
identifies why these are exemplars of virtue. It does not condescend to us by 
pretending that perfect virtue is possible for us; identifying perfect virtue will often 
show us just how far we have to go. Moral theory shows us how far others have to 
go, as well; it gives us ways to evaluate our own and others’ behavior. It abstracts 
away from our flaws and biases, since bowing to these limitations cheapens 
morality. While moral theory provides us with moral reasons to do or not do 
certain things, those reasons are not necessarily reasons that are accessible to us. 
Because we are clouded by our own biases and lack of understanding, we may not 
ever be able to appreciate all the moral reasons, much less act on them. But seeing 
how distant morality is may inspire us to make progress. We can see that we have 
a lot to do to become better people, and we may look to the moral exemplars as 
examples of what we should try to become. If morality were closer to us, we might 
become complacent about our shortcomings. When moral theory sets the ultimate 
standard, it is morality ‘in the sky;’ it need not take note of the facts on the ground. 
But on a second view, a different picture of morality emerges. Here, a 
central task of moral theory is to guide our actions. This view of morality might be 
linked to some or all of the following beliefs: 
For moral theory to guide our actions, it must be able to tell us what to do 
given the kinds of people we are. If morality has nothing to say to flawed and 
imperfect people, then we can’t make practical use of it. This means that morality 
should in some ways be constrained by our weaknesses and limitations. When we 
look at the actions that are, given our flaws, genuinely open to us, moral theory 
should be able to tell us whether one is better than another. It should be able to 
govern our interactions with other flawed people. This is moral theory that we can 
use in our deliberations: we can understand the moral reasons of this kind of moral 
theory, and we have the potential to act on them. This kind of moral theory is 
livable; we can follow at least some of its prescriptions, because it gives us advice 
that’s suitable for us as we are. It can inspire us to be better, because it can give us 
the hope of acting decently. A morality that is further away may make being a good 
person seem hopelessly remote. Morality ‘in the sky’ can’t guide our actions if it’s 
too remote from what we are actually like. For this, we need morality ‘on the 
ground.’ 
Perhaps you aren’t persuaded that one or the other of these is really a task 
of morality. Many people aren’t. But the thing is, they disagree. Some people I’ve 
discussed this with think that moral theory clearly has the first, and only the first, 
task: it should set us an ultimate standard, tell us the truth about morality. Anything 
else is ‘advice column’ morality. Other people think that moral theory clearly has 
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the second, and only the second, task: it should tell us what to do. If moral theory 
can’t guide our actions, morality really isn’t its subject at all. This disagreement is 
itself, I think, instructive. We may not universally accord both of these tasks of 
moral theory primary importance, or even any importance at all. Yet both of these 
views of what moral theory should do are picking up on something important and, 
to at least some people, intuitive about the nature of morality.  
And yet these two tasks often seem to be mutually incompatible. In some 
cases, perhaps we are perfectly capable of living up to the standards set by the first 
view of moral theory. But many times we are not. Some quirk of our psychology or 
defect of our motivation gets in the way. When this happens, moral theory that only 
sets the ultimate standard cannot also give us guidance, beyond telling us to live up 
to a standard that’s hopelessly remote. Moral theory that can give guidance is moral 
theory we actually have a chance of putting to use, but if it is our only moral theory, 
it is apt to seem complacent or parochial. It doesn’t give us the full, often painful, 
truth about what we ought to be doing. It doesn’t always push us to become better; 
sometimes it’s too limited by the view from where we are right now. So these two 
tasks of moral theory often seem to be in direct conflict with each other. How can 
moral theory do everything we need it to do? 
One way to explain the differences between these views of what moral 
theory is and what tasks it has is to look through the lens of the voluntarist 
constraint, the idea that ‘ought’ implies ‘can.’ Here’s a preview of what I will argue: 
these views of moral theory are linked to different views about what ‘can’ means 
in each context—that is, whether it’s tied to the very limits of what we can do or 
whether it hews more closely to our actual psychological and motivational makeup. 
Once we see the different kinds of ‘can’ at play in moral theory, we can begin to 
untangle this problem. But in order to do that, we must look more closely at the 
voluntarist constraint. 
2. The voluntarist constraint 
Most philosophers (although not all) accept the voluntarist constraint, that ought 
implies can. They believe, that is, that you can be obligated to do only those things 
that are possible for you to do. The voluntarist constraint is widely accepted partly 
because it strikes an intuitive chord. For one thing, moral theory that tells me to do 
things that are clearly impossible seems unfair. If my moral theory directs me to 
fly, then by failing to fly I am doing something wrong. But since I can’t live up to this 
demand, morality is being unfair to me. For another, a moral theory that violates 
the voluntarist constraint is bad at giving us guidance. If my moral theory tells me 
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to fly, what guidance can that give me? Moral obligations that stretch far beyond 
what’s possible are too distant to give me information about what I should do.  
Still, just because it’s plausible doesn’t mean it’s right. For every argument 
for the voluntarist constraint, someone has developed a counterargument.2 I won’t 
adjudicate those arguments here, because I want to focus on a different question. 
If we accept for the sake of argument that ought implies can, then we need to know 
what that means. In particular, what does it mean to say we ‘can’ do something? 
One option is to hold that there is only one meaning of ‘can’ that is relevant to 
determining our obligations. But which one?  
2.1 Possibility  
When we say that someone can do something, we may mean any of several 
different things, including (but not limited to) the following:  
2.1.1 Physical  
I ‘physically can’ do something if it is possible for me to do it given facts about my 
physiology. Here, I mean solely facts about the body, as distinct from facts about 
the mind or brain. Under normal conditions, it is physically possible for me to 
attend a baseball game on a Sunday afternoon: I am strong enough and coordinated 
enough to get up off the couch, walk to my car, and walk from my parking spot into 
the baseball stadium. If, however, I were to become too weak to open the door to 
my house, or if someone locked me in, it would now be physically impossible for 
me to attend the game: I simply could not use my body in a way that would make it 
possible. This is the thinnest sense of possibility I discuss here: it relies on the 
fewest facts about us. 
2.1.2 Psychological 
A thicker concept is psychological possibility. I ‘psychologically can’ do something 
if it is physically possible and it is possible for me to do it given facts about my 
psychology—that is, given facts about my mind or brain. Various features of an 
individual’s psychology may render something psychologically impossible: certain 
pathologies, intelligence deficits, memory loss, and so on. Conversely, for people 
with unusually good minds, the psychological possibilities are less constrained: 
more things are psychologically possible for someone with a photographic memory 
than for me. Given the facts about my psychology, I can attend a baseball game on 
a Sunday afternoon: I don’t have a psychological block against going. If I had 
agoraphobia, however, it would be psychologically impossible. It would be 
impossible for me to make myself spend time out in an open space among the large 
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crowds of a baseball game. It would still be physically possible, of course. Nothing 
in the structure of my muscles, bones, joints, and so on prevents me from going to 
the game: if I had the right kind of mind, I could go. Someone else with an identical 
musculature but with a different brain could go to the game. But if I were an 
agoraphobe, I would not have the right kind of mind: given my condition, it would 
be psychologically impossible for me to go to the game. Our minds circumscribe the 
set of things we can do: the set of things that are psychologically possible is a subset 
of those that are physically possible.  
2.1.3 Motivational 
The final, and for our purposes, thickest modality is motivational possibility. I 
‘motivationally can’ do something if it is psychologically possible and, somewhere 
in my motivational set, there is a first-order motivation to do that thing. By 
‘motivations,’ I mean desires in a very broad sense—I can have the desire, or the 
motivation, to take out the trash or go to the dentist, even though no part of me 
looks forward to or enjoys those experiences. We do not act on every first-order 
motivation; one may be outweighed by another, stronger motivation. But for 
something to be motivationally possible, a first-order motivation must be present. 
I can want to want to take out the trash, but until that second-order desire activates 
a first-order desire, taking out the trash is motivationally impossible for me. When 
something is motivationally impossible, on the other hand, no first-order 
motivation exists.  
In the case we’ve been discussing, given that I am not agoraphobic, it is 
psychologically possible for me to go to the baseball game. But, as it turns out, I just 
don’t enjoy baseball. I think it’s boring. In this case, I have no first-order motivation 
to go to the game. Absent some second-order motivation (all my friends are going; 
I have to meet another secret agent in a crowded location to hand off the evidence; 
my foreign friend wants to experience American sports), I cannot make myself go. 
There’s not a physical block; there’s not a block coming from my psychological 
abilities or inabilities. Going to a baseball game just for the love of baseball is 
motivationally impossible for me: I cannot want to do it.  
In the same way that psychological possibility constrains physical 
possibility, motivational possibility constrains psychological possibility. Only some 
things are impossible for us because we lack first-order motivations. In cases of 
psychological impossibility, I might have strong first-order motivations yet still be 
unable to do something. An agoraphobe may dearly want to go to the game and yet 
be unable to, because some feature of her psychology is blocking her motivations 
from being effective.  
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2.2 Evaluating ‘can’ 
As the examples I’ve offered show, different modalities are relevant in different 
contexts. If I’m deciding how to spend a Saturday on my own, ‘I can go to the 
baseball game’ is false in the sense that matters. But if what I can physically do 
becomes relevant—if it matters whether you can reasonably request that I go to 
the game with you and your visiting British friend—then it matters that there’s a 
sense in which ‘I can go to the baseball game’ is true. ‘I can go’ and ‘I can’t go’ are 
both true at the same time, but they’re true on different senses of ‘can.’ So there is 
no one true analysis of ‘can’; there are many, and their truth varies by context.   
Adding to the difficulty of understanding ‘can’ is that these modalities are 
not always clearly distinct. The lines between modalities are blurry. While my 
Midwestern relatives enjoy eating lutefisk, I gag whenever I try any; this reaction 
is probably mostly psychological, but it certainly seems to involve features of my 
physiology too.3 If my bad memory makes it psychologically impossible for me to 
remember your birthday, on the other hand, this psychological deficit might be 
connected to my motivations. These modalities are thus perhaps better thought of 
as regions on a continuum, without clear bright lines to distinguish them. At the 
same time, there may be finer gradations to make within modalities. What’s 
psychologically possible for me normally may be impossible for me when I’m under 
duress; there are finer gradations to make within each kind of possibility. But that 
the borders between these modalities are vague does not mean they are all of a 
piece. We may not be able to tell exactly where physical possibility bleeds into 
psychological possibility, but on only one of those senses can an agoraphobe truly 
go to the game.4  
 2.3 ‘Can’ and ‘ought implies can’ 
We might expect those who accept the voluntarist constraint to recognize the 
significance of the multiple meanings of ‘can.’ Not so.5  Instead, philosophers 
working on understanding the constraint have tended to pick one version of ‘can’ 
to tie obligations to. But interpreting the voluntarist constraint in this unitary way 
leads us into trouble, because a moral theory with only one voluntarist constraint 
cannot satisfactorily perform all of morality’s tasks. To see why, consider a recent 
disagreement between David Estlund and David Wiens about the uses of ‘ought 
implies can’ within political philosophy.  
Estlund interprets the ‘can’ of ‘ought implies can’ in this way: ‘A person is 
able to (can) do something if and only if, were she to try and not give up, she would 
tend to succeed’ (212). This is essentially physical possibility—on Estlund’s view, 
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we can even stay awake for four days straight (213).6 Estlund argues for this thin 
voluntarist constraint by appealing to the case of Bill the polluter (call him Selfish 
Bill), who claims that he is not required to refrain from dumping his garbage by the 
side of the road because he is too selfish to refrain (rather than because he has 
some phobia or compulsion) (220). Estlund claims that we still blame Selfish Bill 
for his garbage-dumping. Therefore, selfishness is not the kind of thing that can 
block a moral requirement; therefore, no motivational inabilities block 
requirements, even if they are inabilities all humans share (220). Because features 
of human nature do not block the requirements of justice, we wind up with a very 
thin sense of ‘can’ for the voluntarist constraint.  
Wiens argues that the relevant sense of ‘can’ is much thicker: to him, ‘ought 
implies can will (in good faith)’ (339).7 He asks us to imagine Claudia, who makes 
repeated good-faith attempts to write a book but each time only writes a few pages 
before she gives up (Wiens 341). Can Claudia write a book? Wiens thinks she can’t; 
she’s proven that it is impossible for her to complete the sequence of events that 
results in a finished book. Similarly, whether Selfish Bill can avoid dumping his 
trash by the road depends on the reasons for his claimed inability. If Bill’s 
selfishness prevents him from making a good-faith effort to refrain from dumping, 
then he cannot refrain from dumping (and thus has no obligation not to dump); if 
he could, with the right good-faith effort, work past his selfishness, then he can 
refrain. While Estlund believes that moral theories ought to idealize away from 
human nature, Wiens says that we must take into account at least some of our 
inabilities when determining our obligations.  
But neither of these single readings of ‘can’ tells the whole story. Wiens 
identifies an important distinction between good- and bad-faith motivational 
inabilities: there seems to be an important difference between someone who can’t 
do something because she is too selfish or cruel to do it and someone who can’t do 
something even when she tries in good faith to do it (345). This suggests that 
Estlund was too quick to reach the conclusion that motivational inabilities never 
block moral requirements; he may have traded unfairly on our lack of sympathy 
for someone who claims to be incurably selfish. Estlund’s view simply leaves us on 
the hook for too much—if no part of human nature counts against our being able 
to do something, then our obligations will far exceed what we could ever do. 
Wiens’s version of the constraint can give us guidance in a way that Estlund’s 
thinner, more remote constraint cannot. It is better at performing the second task 
of moral theory, that of giving us action guidance that we can use as we are. 
But then again, Estlund is motivated by trying to figure out what justice is: 
‘those to whom we owe justice do not lose their claim on us just because it might 
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turn out that we are not, perhaps even by our nature, disposed to deliver it’ (230). 
If Wiens’s Claudia has promised a publisher that she will write a book, then her 
inveterate procrastination is not enough to void her contract just because she’s 
tried in good faith to overcome it. Unlike if Claudia were physically unable to 
complete the book, there is a sense in which she still can complete the book, a sense 
which would make it possible if not for her flaws.8 Moral theory should let us hold 
others to account for their flaws even when they’ve made good-faith efforts to 
overcome those flaws. When Claudia has promised, we should say that Claudia 
ought (in some sense) to write the book; with Wiens’s ‘can,’ we cannot. Some 
opponents of the voluntarist constraint contend that it lets us off the hook for 
things we should be responsible for; Wiens’s version is especially susceptible to 
this criticism.9 Estlund’s version of the constraint can perform the first task, by 
providing an ultimate standard for us to live up to, regardless of our flaws; Wiens’s 
has a more difficult time doing so. 
Thus both Estlund’s thinner and Wiens’s thicker specifications of ‘can’ seem 
to run into difficulties: neither can fully provide an ultimate standard and give us 
action guidance. What if we split the difference with a moderate voluntarist 
constraint, something like ‘ought implies psychologically can’? This only inherits, 
rather than solving, the problems with the extremes. When Claudia promises to 
finish the book but is psychologically unable to comply with this obligation, it 
seems entirely appropriate to hold her responsible. She has promised: and a 
promise doesn’t disappear just because your flaws make it impossible for you to 
carry it out. A moderate voluntarist constraint rules out holding that Claudia has 
an obligation (of any kind) in this case, since such an obligation would be 
psychologically impossible. This is too lax, inheriting the problems of a 
motivational voluntarist constraint. 
At the same time, even a moderate voluntarist constraint can only provide 
limited action guidance. What should Selfish Bill do, given that it is motivationally 
impossible for him to refrain from dumping his trash? If moral theory only speaks 
to what’s psychologically possible for him, it ignores that his motivations make it 
impossible for him to do the right thing. Since thick voluntarist constraints are 
closely tied to your motivations, they can guide your actions in a wide variety of 
circumstances. Thin and moderate voluntarist constraints can’t do that. They may 
provide long-term goals for you—they may direct you to change your motivational 
structure—but they cannot give you immediate action guidance that draws on the 
motivations you have right now. This is too demanding, inheriting the problem of 
a physical voluntarist constraint. If we want morality that can both provide 
standards and give us guidance, we need an alternative strategy. 
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3. Moral theory with multiple voluntarist constraints 
Rather than trying to find one single meaning of the voluntarist constraint that can 
account for everything we want morality to do, we must develop multiple versions 
of the voluntarist constraint using the different modalities discussed above. Just 
like multiple senses of ‘can’ are often true, we are often under multiple sets of 
obligations at once. Our moral theories (whether these are consequentialist, 
deontological, or virtue theories, or something else entirely) must be sensitive to 
multiple voluntarist constraints: ‘(this kind of) ought implies physically can,’ ‘(that 
kind of) ought implies psychologically can,’ and so on. This means that any moral 
theory will saddle us with multiple sets of obligations. We start with a thin 
voluntarist constraint, ‘ought implies physically can.’ This provides us with the 
ultimate standard, one which doesn’t yield to our psychological or motivational 
limitations. But in order to get more practical guidance, we look to moral theory 
that uses thicker voluntarist constraints. If we are thinking about how to improve 
our motivations so as to become morally better in the medium term, we will want 
to consider obligations drawn from what’s psychologically possible for us.10 When 
we need immediate moral guidance, we look at what’s motivationally possible for 
us and draw a third set of obligations from that set of possible actions.  
What I’m offering here is more or less a contextualist analysis of ‘ought 
implies can.’ Contextualism is the metaethical view that the semantic content of 
certain ethical claims partially depends on some feature of the context in which 
those claims are made. Relevantly for our purposes, contextualists tend to endorse 
contextualist semantics not only for ‘ought’ but also for ‘can.’11 This view is one way 
to explain how the two interact—that is, how to be a contextualist not just about 
‘ought’ and ‘can’ but about ‘ought implies can.’ Because the semantic content of 
‘can’ varies by context, and because we are granting the truth of the voluntarist 
constraint, the semantic content of ‘ought’ varies along with it. Thus we get 
different versions of the voluntarist constraint in different contexts. If the context 
is one in which purely physical possibility is conversationally salient, such as the 
context of ideal theory, then claims about the voluntarist constraint have a different 
content than if the context is one in which motivations matter as well.  
Of course, there are different strains of contextualism. Some contextualists 
hold that the meaning of the moral ‘ought’ is relative to the speaker’s moral 
standards. This strain of contextualism is friendly to anti-realist metaethical views, 
although it does not strictly entail them.12 But other strains are more friendly to 
realism, leaving open the possibility that at least sometimes the conversationally 
salient moral standards are mind-independent and objectively true. 13 While I think 
my kind of contextualism is open to either realist or anti-realist metaethical views, 
Ideal Theory and “Ought Implies Can” (preprint)  Amy Berg 
11 
 
my sympathies lie with the realist ones. The meaning of ‘ought implies can,’ then, 
is determined by the relevant ability and by whatever moral theory turns out to be 
true. At any rate, my view does not imply anti-realist contextualism.  
The contexts that are especially salient for our purposes—those related to 
motivational, psychological, and physical ability—range from less to more 
idealized. So this is one way that the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory 
can solve problems in moral theory. In the ideal world, we would lack the 
limitations we have in the non-ideal world. We wouldn’t have the psychological or 
motivational inabilities that make it in some sense impossible for us to comply with 
morality’s demands. But in the actual world, these inabilities make it impossible for 
us to comply. That’s why we need distinct non-ideal theory that we can use to guide 
our actions in the non-ideal world. We derive our non-ideal obligations from our 
ideal obligations, but we modify them in light of our psychological and motivational 
limits. Because we have at least two sets of limits—psychological and 
motivational—we need different versions of non-ideal theory to carry out the 
different tasks of moral theory. So while there are two levels of theory—ideal 
theory, which provides the ultimate standard, and non-ideal theory, which 
provides action guidance—there are also multiple levels within non-ideal theory. 
Some non-ideal possibilities are further from the ideal than others. 14  
3.1 An example: act utilitarianism 
Assume, just for now, that act utilitarianism is true.15 Then think about the duty of 
beneficence. On act utilitarianism, I have (at least) three sets of obligations of aid. 
First, I am obligated to render aid as far as is physically possible. While this level of 
possibility is often unhelpful for providing immediate practical guidance, it tells me 
what I should aspire to be able to do. Even the staunchest act utilitarian might 
admit that it is psychologically impossible to live up to act-utilitarian principles one 
hundred percent of the time—but as long as compliance with those principles is 
physically possible, I am nevertheless doing something wrong when I fail to live up 
to them. If aiding the needy consists in writing checks to Oxfam, then I am obligated 
to write checks to Oxfam until I reach the outer limit of what I am physically capable 
of doing.  
On a non-ideal theory that includes facts about my psychology, I am 
obligated to render aid as far as my psychology will let me. Perhaps it is 
psychologically impossible for me to never favor my family over complete 
strangers. I may be able, as much as it hurts, to divide my money exactly equally, 
but I may still be unable to spend all of my time performing acts of beneficence, 
instead occasionally going to watch my kid play soccer. In this case, then, my 
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obligation is to help others as far as my psychology will let me but favor my own 
family where I must.  What’s psychologically possible can often be useful as a 
medium-term goal: it isn’t as minimal as the set of obligations that are 
motivationally possible, but it also isn’t as unrealistic for us to consider as bare 
physical possibility is. That unrealistic obligation, tied to a physical version of the 
voluntarist constraint, still exists. It’s the source of my psychologically possible 
obligation, and it is in the background providing the ultimate standard of morality. 
But when it’s impossible in any sense, non-ideal theory steps in. 
And finally, consider an even more non-ideal theory, which takes into 
account my motivation. For the purposes of immediate action guidance, this non-
ideal theory tells us that I have the obligation to render aid as far as I can motivate 
myself to. This level, the most constrained set of obligations, gives immediate 
practical guidance. When I’m thinking about what to do right now, surely I should 
only consider whatever I can motivate myself to do. While other options exist, and 
may be in some sense obligatory, they are impossible in the sense of ‘can’ that 
matters for guiding actions. So if I’m deciding how to act in the short term, I should 
only consider those options that are motivationally possible for me. If I cannot even 
be motivated to give up buying lots of Christmas presents for my family, then I 
should aid as much as I can consistent with the amount of motivation I have to be 
beneficent. Ignoring my motivations will lead me into trouble—if I convince myself 
I can give away all my money, spend all of December researching various charities, 
and then find myself in the toy aisle on Christmas Eve, I will violate the obligations 
of both ideal theory (by not actually giving away my money) and non-ideal theory 
(by buying my children whatever lousy presents are still unsold). 
Whatever the correct moral theory is, we start with the maximum 
obligations of that theory and then add thicker and thicker voluntarist constraints 
to get closer to what we are actually able to do. The different kinds of possibility 
thus act as successive filters. When we move from ideal to non-ideal theory, we 
filter out obligations that are impossible in a non-ideal context. These filters 
narrow down our options until, in order to get action guidance, we are only 
considering things we are currently motivationally able to do. 
But this filter metaphor isn’t perfect. It might give the impression that since 
we are at every step removing obligations, surely we can never find ourselves with 
more obligations than we had at a thinner level of possibility. Yet as we move from 
ideal to non-ideal theory, we may find ourselves with more duties to make up for 
things we (in some sense) can’t do. If I have arachnophobia, perhaps I am not 
psychologically obligated to save a child from being bitten by a spider. But I may 
have (psychologically possible) duties to make up for my failure to save the child. I 
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might have duties to visit the child in the hospital, to pay some of his hospital bills, 
to undergo therapy to try to treat my phobia, and so on. And then there are our 
duties of self-improvement, which help to solve a potential problem with the view. 
3.2 Transition to the ideal 
That problem is this: it might seem like the theory that we actually use to guide our 
actions requires us to do hardly anything. If I am not motivated to donate money to 
the poor, or save a drowning child, or refrain from saying something mean to 
someone, then non-ideal theory tells me that I am not obligated to. Doesn’t this let 
me off the hook too easily?  
A first response is that even this very non-ideal theory is not as lax as it may 
seem. There is an important distinction between ‘can’t,’ ‘won’t,’ and ‘unlikely to’: 
‘ought implies can’ has never meant ‘ought implies is easily within our grasp.’ We 
are off the hook for things we cannot be motivated to do, but we are not off the hook 
for things we can be motivated to do but won’t do or are unlikely to do. If I can bring 
myself to want to take out the trash, then I must do it, even if I would rather do 
something else. Laziness does not remove an obligation, even on the most non-
ideal version of our moral theory. In order for non-ideal theory to be unable to 
command something, it must truly be motivationally impossible for us.  
But even though motivational obligations can sometimes be demanding, 
sometimes they simply aren’t. Maybe I truly cannot bring myself to want to give 
strangers equal consideration to my family members. In this case, a non-ideal 
moral theory which uses a motivational voluntarist constraint cannot require me 
to give equal consideration to strangers. This would be a problem if this were the 
only moral theory we had. But it’s not. The two types of non-ideal theory show us 
why.16 
The first type of non-ideal theory, non-transitional theory, tells us about our 
obligations in the non-ideal world. When I’ve been talking about non-ideal moral 
theory (about the parts of our moral theories that operate with psychological and 
motivational voluntarist constraints), I have mostly been talking about non-
transitional theory. Even if I’m permanently stuck with my non-ideal motivations, 
there are some obligations I can act on right now.  
The second type is transitional theory. This kind of theory tells us about our 
obligations to transition to the ideal. To see the difference, think about different 
reasons for punishing wrongdoers. We might punish for non-transitional non-ideal 
reasons: in the non-ideal world, people do the wrong thing, and we want to express 
society’s disapproval. We might also punish for transitional reasons: we want 
people to learn from their mistakes in order to do better next time. 
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In the case of moral theory, I have transitional obligations to bring my 
motivations in line with what is psychologically and, ultimately, physically possible 
for me. We need these transitional obligations so that morality can carry out its 
first task, of providing us with the ultimate standard to live up to. Because there’s 
a sense in which I can complete any action that is physically possible for me, it 
remains a real obligation in that sense even if it is psychologically or motivationally 
impossible for me. These more demanding obligations don’t disappear just because 
of my motivational or psychological defects.  
This helps to answer the worry that motivational moral theory is not 
demanding enough. I am obligated to try to become the kind of person who is 
motivationally able to comply with these other obligations. I should try to 
rearrange my motivational structure to comply with the obligations that are 
psychologically possible for me; I should try to improve my psychological structure 
in order to comply with the obligations that are physically possible for me. If I don’t, 
I am ignoring some of my moral obligations. Because moral theory with a 
motivational voluntarist constraint is not the entirety of our moral theory, we are 
not reliant exclusively on non-ideal theory.  
In order to fulfill my obligations to transition from non-ideal moral theory 
to more ideal moral theory, I must use the stock of motivations I currently have in 
order to become a better person. In the case of fulfilling my obligations of 
beneficence, for example, it might be motivationally impossible for me to fulfill 
those obligations directly. But I may be able to trick myself into living up to those 
obligations. Perhaps I could get my spouse to set up a monthly transfer of money 
from my art fund to Oxfam. Over time, I might come to realize that I don’t miss that 
money; this realization might lead me to develop the motivation to carry out my 
charitable giving myself. If it’s motivationally impossible for me to be nice to 
someone I intensely dislike, maybe I can bargain myself into it by saying just one 
decent thing to that person and then leaving the room. As I get used to tricking 
myself into doing things I cannot be motivated to do, I can become habituated into 
adopting those motivations. As I work within the motivations I have, better 
motivations may become possible.   
For some people, though, this transition may truly be impossible. Even if it 
is physically and psychologically possible to be a better person, it is completely 
motivationally impossible. Those people are off the hook—they are not obligated 
to become better people. For someone to be let off the hook in this way, it would 
have to be the case that he is completely devoid of all motivation to become a better 
person. More than that, that person would have to be completely devoid of all 
motivations that could become motivations to be a better person. It’s already 
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questionable whether someone who is completely devoid of even potential moral 
motivation can be held morally responsible. But most of us are capable of becoming 
better people, and so most of us are required to try.  
So our transitional obligations are what require us to become better people 
and keep this framework for morality from being too lax. But the process is often 
not simple. Sometimes it will be easier to change certain physical attributes than 
certain motivational ones. I might be highly motivated to become a construction 
worker, in order to build homes for those who don’t have them, but lack the 
minimum strength needed. In order to get the job in construction, I’ll have to begin 
a weight-training regimen. Given that I’m highly motivated, I may find that the 
changes in my physical abilities come easily. On the other hand, as we have just 
seen, some people may never change their motivations if they see no reason to. 
That is, it may be easier to remove some filters at the top, at the physical level, than 
at the bottom, at the motivational level. At the same time, some physical and 
psychological limitations are irremediable no matter what our limitations are. But 
every change begins with changes to our motivations—in order for me to start 
lifting weights, I have to be motivated to do so. All removal of obstacles to the 
performance of our moral duties requires us to have the correct motivations in 
place, but some motivations are easier to correct than others.  
Another complication is that our obligations at the various levels (ideal 
theory, transitional non-ideal theory, non-transitional non-ideal theory) may 
conflict. A case of conflict between my ideal and non-ideal obligations might look 
something like this: ideal theory requires me to refrain from blowing large sums of 
money at the blackjack table. But I am not motivated to quit gambling, so non-ideal 
theory does not obligate me to quit. On a particular Saturday night, I have promised 
a friend I’ll go to a casino with him. If I stay home instead, I’ll strengthen my 
motivation to quit ever so slightly, but I’ll have broken a promise. Here, it seems 
that my ideal and non-ideal obligations are in conflict: ideally, I would never 
gamble, but since I am incapable of fulfilling that obligation, I am obligated to keep 
my promise. 
So what should I do? Keep my promise or refrain from gambling? 
Remember that we’ve already said that it is motivationally impossible for me to act 
ideally. Because I cannot be motivated to quit gambling entirely, ideal theory does 
not provide immediate action guidance. So the only immediately possible 
obligations I can have with respect to this ultimate standard are obligations of 
transition. Given the choices open to me, this conflict between ideal and non-ideal 
obligations boils down to a conflict between transitional and non-transitional 
obligations. Should I keep my promise to my friend? Or should I refuse, upsetting 
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my friend, as part of a project of increasing my motivations to give up gambling 
later?  
The details about how to resolve this kind of conflict will depend largely on 
the moral theory we accept. If utilitarianism is true, questions about transition will 
be answered by figuring out what will bring about more utility in the long term. 
Perhaps I am required to break my promise to my friend now so that I can quit 
gambling later. If deontology is true, transition to the ideal will properly be 
constrained by moral considerations such as basic rights. I am probably not 
allowed, all things considered, to murder someone now, even if that helps me fulfill 
some obligation of ideal theory later. We have an idea of the kinds of considerations 
that will provide all-things-considered guidance when obligations conflict: which 
moral theory I accept, what my options are, and how they help or impede my 
transition to ideal morality. But filling in the blanks will require us to say more 
about the content, not just the structure, of moral theory. 
3.3 How demanding is the ideal? 
One argument sometimes made against certain moral theories is that they are too 
demanding. What critics making this argument often mean is that the moral theory 
requires people to do things that are unrealistic to expect of people given what we 
are like. Flanagan makes an objection of this kind against act utilitarianism: act 
utilitarianism cannot be correct, he argues, because we can’t do the moral math it 
requires. It is impossible for us to, with our limited time and cognitive resources, 
continually compute all possible actions we could take, their consequences, and the 
relative utility of each of these consequences (Flanagan 33-4). Another stock 
objection to act utilitarianism is that, in defiance of our psychology, it requires us 
to give all people exactly equal consideration. That’s not something that most 
people are capable of doing.  
 But once we divide moral theory up into ideal and non-ideal versions, this 
kind of objection no longer gives us good grounds for dismissing a moral theory. 
When we are deciding which ideal theory of morality (ideal utilitarianism, 
deontology, virtue ethics, etc.) is correct, we cannot bring in facts about what is 
psychologically or motivationally impossible for non-ideal people to do. The 
ultimate standard of morality may not yield to our flaws; this would cheapen 
morality. If ideal morality demands more than we’re psychologically or 
motivationally capable of, that’s a flaw we should try to overcome, not a flaw in our 
ideal theory. So act utilitarianism cannot be dismissed on the grounds that 
Flanagan gives (33-34). Kantian deontology cannot be dismissed on the grounds 
that it is impossible for people to act solely from a motive of duty (Flanagan 36). If 
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people are physically capable of doing these things, then ideal morality can require 
them to do so. Questions about what our obligations are given our psychological 
and motivational inabilities are now questions for non-ideal theory. If a non-ideal 
theory doesn’t correctly take our psychological or motivational limitations into 
account, that isn’t a mark against its counterpart ideal theory; it’s a sign that we 
should calibrate the non-ideal filters differently. 
 But this doesn’t mean that the most extreme version of moral theory is 
necessarily the right one. Moral theory may make less extreme demands not 
because people are unable to comply with extreme demands but because morality 
should not make extreme demands even on those who can comply with them.17 
Where Flanagan’s objections to act utilitarianism don’t work, Scheffler shows how 
a different kind of strategy can succeed. Scheffler argues that moral theory ought 
to take our personal integrity into account—it ought to give us some room to care 
about our own concerns and projects, even out of proportion to their impartial 
value (1982, 21). Because act utilitarianism requires us to maximize impartially 
good consequences, it can’t do this. What we need, Scheffler thinks, is a view that 
includes a prerogative to give one’s own interests this kind of extra value.  
Notice that this kind of view need not rely on any claims about inability at 
all.18 Its claim is that even people who are psychologically and motivationally 
capable of becoming act utilitarians should not be morally required to do so. 
Scheffler’s theory is less demanding than utilitarianism not because of claims about 
what we can do but because of claims about what a good life for us is like and what 
is properly important to us: morality should not alienate us even if its demands are 
possible (in all senses) for us. This ideal theory is different from ideal act 
utilitarianism, and subsequent non-ideal theories will be similarly distinct: we 
arrive at them by applying the thicker senses of possibility to each ideal theory. The 
disagreement between Scheffler and act utilitarians now centers on which ideal 
theory makes the right demands of ideal agents. 
The differences between Scheffler and Flanagan help to illustrate which 
kinds of demandingness complaints can legitimately be made against ideal 
theories. It is not legitimate to reject ideal moral theories on the grounds that non-
ideal agents cannot comply with their demands. We can certainly reject non-ideal 
moral theories on those grounds. If non-ideal theory with a motivational 
voluntarist constraint requires me to do something motivationally impossible for 
me, I should revise my theory so that it can provide me with usable guidance. But 
if my ideal theory requires me to do something motivationally impossible, I cannot 
reject it for that reason: I must instead try to become able to live up to its demands.  
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Still, in thinking about the kinds of demands ideal moral theory can make, 
it is legitimate for me to deliberate about what ideal morality should be like. What 
kinds of demands is it appropriate to make of ideal agents? What are the 
appropriate limits of morality even where compliance is not an issue? Ideal moral 
theories can come with more or less extensive demands. What they have in 
common is that they arrive at those demands not by looking at what people are 
capable of but at what morality may reasonably ask of people, regardless of their 
capabilities. Our arguments about what ideal moral theory should be like cannot 
be predicated on what non-ideal agents are capable of.  
3.4 Blame 
History is full of people who acted in ways which we regard as morally abhorrent 
but which seemed perfectly legitimate at the time. The men (and women) who 
worked against women’s suffrage were committing grave injustices, but many of 
them sincerely believed that women ought not be allowed to vote. These people 
seem to have done something wrong, and yet an opponent of women’s suffrage in 
the 19th century seems far less blameworthy than a 21st-century opponent would 
be.  
When we divide up moral theory into ideal and non-ideal versions, we get 
different sets of obligations corresponding to different versions of the voluntarist 
constraint. This means that if someone fails to fulfill an obligation of ideal theory, 
blame may simultaneously be appropriate and inappropriate. It is appropriate to 
blame someone insofar as he could have fulfilled an obligation, but it is 
inappropriate to blame him insofar as he could not. People for whom the 
obligations of ideal theory are fully possible are fully blameworthy if they fail to 
support women’s right to vote. But for those for whom the obligations of ideal 
theory are impossible, we need a different story.   
Now, perhaps some earlier opponents of women’s suffrage didn’t have the 
epistemic ability to become aware of the injustices they were committing; like 
physical and psychological ability, epistemic ability may affect the shape of our 
obligations.19 But with the advent of the women’s suffrage movement, epistemic 
inability seems like a less plausible explanation.  
Setting aside, then, questions of epistemic ability, questions about 
psychological and motivational ability remain. Given the views of society at the 
time, it required an abnormal moral courage to accept gender equality; many of us 
are just not that psychologically strong. On non-ideal theory, we cannot blame the 
opponents of women’s suffrage, since standing up to societal norms exceeded their 
psychological ability. But ideal theory gives us room to blame them. They should 
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have been the kind of people who could be motivationally and psychologically able 
to treat women as equals. They should have had the strength of character to listen 
to the arguments of the suffragists and to accept them, even if that meant going 
against the grain of society. We can blame them for falling short in this way, even 
while acknowledging that their shortcomings were due to psychological and 
motivational inabilities.20  
This means that, although we can still blame these opponents of women’s 
suffrage, we must blame them less than those who commit comparable 
wrongdoing today. To borrow from Watson, 19th-century opponents of women’s 
suffrage are responsible (and thus blameworthy) mostly in 
the attributability sense (229). We can attribute these agents’ attitudes toward 
women’s suffrage to their values and beliefs. But it would be (mostly) wrong for us 
to hold these agents accountable for their beliefs, since it would have been 
motivationally or psychologically impossible for them to believe otherwise. There’s 
only a thin, physical sense on which these agents could have supported women’s 
suffrage. On the other hand, a 21st-century opponent of votes for women, someone 
for whom such a thing would be motivationally possible, is fully responsible in 
both the attributability and the accountability senses.  
When we accept ideal and non-ideal versions of blame, then, we do not 
wind up with the kind of permissive relativism that would never blame people for 
doing things they wrongly believed to be right.21 We can still attribute to them 
actions that were wrong. We can even hold them accountable in a relatively thin 
sense, because there was a thin sense in which doing otherwise was possible for 
them. We also do not wind up with the excessively harsh condemnation that it 
would be unfair to give to people who were, by and large, not actually moral 
monsters (at least, not more so than the rest of us). If ideal obligations are too 
demanding, it can’t be because imperfect people fail to live up to them. But if we 
admit of multiple kinds of blame, to go with the multiple sets of obligations we 
have, then we can blame historical wrongdoers (and anyone else who fails to live 
up to the obligations of ideal theory) only in the ways that are appropriate given 
their circumstances.22 
4. Conclusion: how this resolves the two tensions 
The early sections of this paper were devoted to laying out two tensions in moral 
theory: first, the tension between moral theory’s setting an ultimate standard and 
its ability to provide action guidance; and second, the tension between different 
interpretations of the voluntarist constraint. I then argued that we should adopt 
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ideal and non-ideal moral theory using multiple versions of the voluntarist 
constraint.  
 It should be fairly obvious how this would resolve the second tension, 
between different voluntarist constraints. We don’t have to decide between 
voluntarist constraints: we can have, and in fact need, them all. If we are trying to 
figure out the ultimate standard of morality or justice, as Estlund is, then we should 
use a thin voluntarist constraint. If we are trying to figure out what we should 
actually do in a particular set of circumstances, one in which there are 
psychological or motivational constraints on what we can do, then we should make 
the voluntarist constraint thicker. In general, different types of possibility are 
relevant to different situations, and the same thing is true in moral theory. The 
tension between different voluntarist constraints disappears when we see that 
different constraints are relevant to different things we want moral theory to do. 
 That means that the resolution to the second tension shows us how to 
resolve the first. To determine the ultimate standard for judging actions, we look 
at ideal theory, which operates with a thin voluntarist constraint. But to guide our 
actions, we use non-ideal theory, which operates with thicker voluntarist 
constraints. The kind of moral theory that can guide our actions must take account 
of our motivational and psychological limitations. Whatever ideal moral theory 
turns out to be right—utilitarianism, deontology, or something else—it will need 
non-ideal counterparts. If we recognize that there are obligations that are 
motivationally and psychologically impossible, but physically possible, then we can 
see that there are more ideal versions of morality we should strive for. 
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1 Rawls came up with this distinction (or at least gave it its name), but there is now a 
flourishing literature on these two types of theory, especially as they relate to justice (see 
esp. 214-220). 
2 See Vranas and Howard-Snyder on arguments for the voluntarist constraint. For 
arguments against the constraint, see, among others, Mizrahi, Graham, and King. Sinnott-
Armstrong (1987) and Stern accept weaker readings of the constraint but argue that the 
traditional formulation of the constraint is too strong (on this, see also Streumer’s response 
to Sinnott-Armstrong). For counterarguments specifically directed at the idea that ‘ought 
implies can’ makes morality fairer, see Van Someren Greve and Sinnott-Armstrong (1984).  
3 Lutefisk is cod treated with lye until it becomes a kind of fishy Jell-O. Thanks to Steve 
Swartzer for this vivid example. 
4 And there are other kinds of possibility that might be relevant too—nomological, 
metaphysical, or even logical. Whether you think these are relevant to moral theory will 
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depend on your precise view of the voluntarist constraint. I’ll focus on the three kinds of 
ability I discussed above, but I’ll flag places other kinds might be relevant.  
5 Chuard and Southwood (614) mention in passing the existence of multiple kinds of ‘can,’ 
but they do not pursue this point. Kekes and Jay both note, but neither pursues, the point 
that limitations beyond physical inability might constrain obligations if the voluntarist 
constraint is true. 
6 This sense of possibility appears to exclude from consideration both psychological and 
motivational features (Estlund 230-35). 
7 More precisely: ‘A person is able to (can) [do something] if and only if she successfully 
completes a sequence of acts that manifests [that thing] in a sufficiently high proportion of 
the possible worlds at which she repeatedly makes a good-faith attempt to complete a 
sequence of acts that conduces to [that thing]’ (Wiens 347). Graham has a similar sense of 
‘can’ in mind; on his view, an arachnophobe cannot touch a spider (342). 
8 What if Claudia made herself physically incapable of completing her book (say, by locking 
herself in a room from which she couldn’t escape)? If it’s literally physically impossible, 
then the voluntarist constraint tells us that there can be no obligation. But we can still hold 
Claudia responsible for her past actions, especially those she might have undertaken with 
an eye to limiting her moral obligations in the future.   
9 For a version of this contention, see Mizrahi. Stocker writes that the voluntarist constraint 
‘would almost certainly be uninterestingly false if considered in light of psychological 
inability,’ arguing that the plausible sense of the constraint is a physical sense of ‘can’ (311).  
10 Philosophers sometimes make a distinction between ‘deontic’ and ‘evaluative’ kinds of 
‘ought’ (Howard-Snyder 1; Chuard and Southwood 601). While evaluative ‘ought’ 
statements (‘Life ought to be fair’) do not make demands on us, deontic ‘ought’ statements 
(‘I ought to tell the truth’) do. All versions of ‘ought’ on the non-ideal-to-ideal continuum 
make demands of some kind or another, so the ideal/non-ideal distinction is a distinction 
within the category of deontic ‘ought.’ 
11 For ‘can,’ see Kratzer (1977); for ‘ought,’ some places to look are Chrisman, Finlay, 
Bjornsson and Finlay, Silk, Wedgwood, and Dowell. 
12 Examples can be found in Bjornsson and Finlay, Finlay, and Silk, among others. 
13 Here see Wedgwood, Dowell, and Pittard and Worsnip. 
14 I mentioned above that other kinds of ability (nomological, metaphysical, logical) may be 
relevant in some contexts. If they’re relevant here, then we might get obligations at an even 
more idealized level than physical possibility—obligations that we have because they’re 
metaphysically possible even though they’re physically impossible. Obligations based on 
these senses of possibility probably violate many understandings of the voluntarist 
constraint. But we should leave open here whether there are relevant kinds of ability 
beyond the one I’m picking out as the most ideal, and so even more ideal theories.   
15 This framework applies to any moral theory, but I’m using act utilitarianism here because 
of its simple structure.  
16 For more on the transition from non-ideal to ideal, see Simmons. 
17 See Estlund (222-23). 
18 It’s true that Scheffler sometimes makes suggestions about what is psychologically 
possible for us (see 1992, 68). But he need not rely on those suggestions, since space for 
personal prerogatives can come out of what morality ought to ask of us, not out of what we 
can do. 
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19 See Värynen for a discussion of epistemic possibility (‘certain kinds of information 
pertaining to the act are available’)(302). 
20 This does not imply a tracing view of moral responsibility, since claims about 
responsibility are not traced back to some previous time. Any time there’s a sense in which 
a wrongdoer can fulfill a moral obligation, he’s blameworthy if he doesn’t; any time he can’t, 
he’s not. We don’t need to know how that inability or inability came about. This avoids the 
complications of tracing views (see Vargas and Agule). 
21 For examples of this kind of permissive relativism, see Benson, Levy, Rosen, and Wolf. 
22 Because there are multiple levels of ideal and non-ideal theory, we will potentially 
confront many different attributability/accountability combinations in assigning blame. 
For support for this from a Watson-style view, see Fischer and Tognazzini.   
